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The paper examines the impact of export promotion on aggregate unemployment. We find that 
increases in the share of Export Promotion Agencies' (EPAs) budgets on total exports lead to 
small decreases in aggregate unemployment. This effect is amplified when export promotion 
efforts are concentrated in sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage. On the 
other hand, when EPAs aim at reducing aggregate unemployment by focusing their efforts in 
sectors with high levels of unemployment, then aggregate unemployment increases. These 
results suggest that even if EPAs' priorities were to shift towards reducing unemployment, this 
would be better addressed by focusing on sectors in which the country has a comparative 
advantage rather than sectors with high labor market frictions. 
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1 Introduction1
There is growing evidence that export promotion activities contribute to export growth (for
example Atkin, Khandelwal and Osma, 2017, Broocks and Van Biesebroeck, 2017, and Volpe
and Carballo, 2008, 2010a, 2010b, and 2012). While this export growth almost automatically
lead to employment growth in exporting firms,2 trade economists know at least since Brecher
(1974) that this does not necessarily leads to reductions in aggregate unemployment. This
paper examines the impact that increases in export promotion budgets have on aggregate
levels of unemployment in a panel of 52 countries over the period 2005-2014. Using data
on the sectoral expenditure of Export Promotion Agencies (EPAs) we also explore whether
export promotion efforts should concentrate in sectors with a comparative advantage or in
sectors with high unemployment, when aiming at reducing aggregate unemployment.
We find that a 1 percent increase in the share of EPAs’ budgets in total exports leads on
average to a 0.32 percent reduction in unemployment (or 0.03 percentage points). This is
a qualitatively interesting and statistically significant result, but export promotion does not
seem to have a very large impact on aggregate unemployment. However, the effect can be
significantly amplified if export promotion efforts are concentrated in sectors with a com-
parative advantage without any need to increase EPAs’ budgets. If EPAs were to fully
align their promotion expenditure with each country’s comparative advantage, unemploy-
ment would decline on average by 2.85 percent (or 0.23 percentage points). On the other
hand, if EPAs expenditure were to be fully aligned with sectorial levels of unemployment,
then unemployment would increase on average by 6.22 percent (or 0.50 percentage points).
This suggests that the allocation of promotion efforts across sectors matter if EPAs were to
target aggregate unemployment.
1We are grateful to Céline Carrère, Alvaro Garcia-Marin, Bernard Hoekman, Jaime de Melo, Amelia
Santos-Paulino and participants at the ELSNIT 2019 conference in Paris. We are also grateful to the
support from the R4D project on Trade and Labor Market Outcomes in Developing Countries funded by
the Swiss National Science Foundation and the Swiss Development Cooperation under grant agreement no.
400340-147718, as well as the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under
grant agreement no. 770680 (RESPECT).
2Unless they are accompanied by strong increases in labor productivity as shown for China in the late
1990s by Los, Timmer and de Vries (2015).
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These results are important for at least three reasons. First, EPAs have proliferated over the
last 20 years, and as their effectiveness has been shown in terms of export growth, it is im-
portant to understand whether there are unintended consequences on other important policy
objectives such as unemployment. With export and income growth being often referred to
as being jobless (see Ancharaz, 2011 or Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2017), it is important to
ensure that resources put into export promotion are not contributing to jobless growth, or
worse, increases in unemployment. Second, the results highlight that not all export pro-
motion efforts help reduce aggregate unemployment. The strategic choices made by EPAs
when deciding where to focus their efforts matter. Perhaps more surprisingly, export promo-
tion efforts that target sectors with high unemployment are more likely to lead to increases
in unemployment, whereas those that target sectors with comparative advantage are more
likely to reductions in unemployment. Understanding this heterogeneity is crucial to help
policymakers trying to disentangle what works and what does not work when it comes to
export promotion, and how this may depend on the policy objective associated with the in-
tervention. It also clearly illustrates how focusing efforts in a sector that is slowing down or
for which unemployment is increasing can backfire. Last, but not least, we provide evidence
suggesting that the reallocation of export promotion efforts, rather than increases in export
promotion budgets, are likely to have a larger impact on aggregate unemployment. With
more than 50 percent of EPAs’ budgets being publicly funded and large increases in govern-
ment deficits and public debt over recent years, this is an important result for governments
facing tighter budget constraints.
The main challenges were data related. First, to examine the impact of the allocation of
export promotion expenditures across sectors, one needs data on export promotion expen-
ditures at the sectoral level. This was obtained from three EPAs’ survey where EPAs were
asked to report their export promotion expenditure by sector. These surveys were under-
taken by the World Bank and the European Trade Promotion Organization, and summarized
in Olarreaga, Sperlich and Trachsel (2020). Second, because we want to examine how these
sectoral expenditures correlate with comparative advantage, we need to compute measures of
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comparative advantage across countries and sectors. This was undertaken following Costinot,
Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) gravity model approach where for every year bilateral sec-
toral exports are run on a set of exporter*sector, importer*sector and exporter*importer
fixed effects. The exporter*sector fixed effect of each year is then used as a proxy for the
country’s sectoral comparative advantage. Finally, we need sector level unemployment data,
which is difficult to observe. We rely on an approach developed by Carrère et al. (2020)
which shows that aggregate unemployment can be decomposed into sector level, country
level and year components that can be then used to compute sector level unemployment for
every country and year.
As mentioned earlier there is a large and growing literature showing that export promotion
contributes to export growth. But to our knowledge this is the first paper examining the im-
pact of export promotion on aggregate unemployment. The closest paper to ours is Munch
and Schaur (2017) which focuses on export promotion by the Danish Trade Council and
shows that it leads to a higher level of employment at the firm level, but no evidence is given
for the impact at the aggregate level. It is important to note that this cannot be obtained
by aggregating across exporting firms as resources are pulled away from other exporting and
non-exporting firms which can potentially lead to a decline in aggregate employment. Sim-
ilarly, several papers have examined what type of export promotion works best. Volpe and
Carballo (2010) using data for ProChile show that higher returns are obtained when export
promotion focuses on small exporters. Volpe and Carballo (2008) show that efforts should
focus on the extensive rather than intensive margin, while Broocks and van Biesebroeck
(2017) show that in the case of experienced exporters there could also be positive returns at
the intensive margin. However, none of these papers have explored how the sectoral alloca-
tion of promotion efforts affects the overall returns, and whether efforts should be aligned
with the country’s comparative advantage. Chen, Poncet and Xiong (2017) foucs on this
in the case of export processing zones in China. They showed that the returns in terms of
export value are larger when the sectors that are targeted are aligned with the country’s
comparative advantage. The difference with our work is that we focus on unemployment
rather than export value. In other words, their work suggests that targeting sectors in which
3
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the country has a comparative advantage leads to larger increases in exports, while our work
shows that this would also be accompanied by larger reductions in unemployment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the empirical frame-
work. Section 3 discusses data sources and estimates of comparative advantage and sectoral
unemployment, as well as summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the empirical results and
section 5 concludes.
2 Empirical framework
To assess the impact of export promotion and its allocation across sectors on aggregate
unemployment, we use the following empirical model:
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where Uc,t is the unemployment rate at the national level in country c at period t (in
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the correlation between the EPAs’ budget expenditure across sectors and the sectoral un-
employment (us,c,t). β1 estimates the impact that increases in the share of EPAs’ budget
on total export have on aggregate unemployment. Note that we have no a priori on the
sign of the coefficient. Increases in export promotion lead to export growth, but this can
perfectly be jobless export growth, or worse, it can lead to increases in unemployment if
the firms benefitting from export promotion are less labor-intensive than firms in the rest
of the economy, or are in sectors with higher levels of sectoral unemployment; β2 allows to
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capture the impact of increases in the alignment between export promotion expenditures and
comparative advantage at the sectoral level on unemployment. Again, we have no a priori
on this coefficient as focusing on sectors with comparative advantage can in principle lead to
more or less unemployment depending on labor-intensities or labor market frictions across
sectors; β3 captures the impact of increases in the alignment between export promotion ex-
penditures and sectoral unemployment on aggregate unemployment. Again, there are no a
priori here as focusing on sectors with high levels of unemployment increases labor demand
in sectors with high levels of unemployment and therefore can help reduce unemployment,
but it also shifts resources to sectors where labor market frictions may be stronger leading to
an increase in aggregate unemployment due to a composition effect. Importantly, the sign
of these last two coefficients will allow us to examine how the strategic choice of EPAs in the
allocation of export promotion expenditure across sectors affects aggregate unemployment.
As control variables we have the correlation between comparative advantage and sectoral
unemployment, GDP per capita, and population (the last two in logs), as well as country
and year fixed effects. We control for the correlation between comparative advantage and
sector level unemployment because as shown by Carrère et al. (2020) and Carrère, Grujovic
and Robert-Nicoud (2020) this matters for aggregate unemployment. We expect β4 > 0, as
a higher correlation between comparative advantage and sector level unemployment leads
to higher levels of aggregate unemployment as shown both theoretically and empirically by
Carrère et al. (2020). Indeed, the labor force is attracted into sectors in which the country
has a comparative advantage. If these sectors tend to have higher levels of unemployment,
this will result in higher levels of aggregate unemployment.
The share of export promotion budgets in total exports can be endogeneous in equation
(1). To address this concern we follow Olarreaga Sperlich and Trachsel (2020) instrumental
variable strategy, and use a measure of the broadness of the EPA mandate to instrument for
the share of EPA’s budget. The variable takes the value 1 if export promotion is the only re-
sponsibility of the agency; 2 if it is the top two priority, 3 if it is one of the two top priorities,
4 if it is one of three or more top priorities, and 5 if it is secondary to other priorities. Thus,
5
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as the value of the variable increases, the responsibility of the agency in terms of export
promotion gets diluted. The more often cited responsibilities cited in the World Bank and
International Trade Centre surveys that are given to EPAs apart from export promotion are
investment and tourism promotion. We expect a positive correlation between the broadness
of the agency’s mandate/responsibilities and the size of the budget.
After estimating equation (1) we compute the changes in unemployment that would occur if
EPAs were to fully align their promotion efforts with the country’s comparative advantage
or with the levels of unemployment observed at the sectoral level, illustrating a potential
strategic choice for EPAs.
ΔU(B = CA) = β2 [1− corr (Budget;CA)] + β3 [corr (CA; u)− corr (Budget; u)] (2)
ΔU(B = u) = β2 [corr (CA; u)− corr (Budget;CA)] + β3 [1− corr (Budget; u)] (3)
The change in unemployment if EPAs were to fully align their promotion expenditure with
their comparative advantage (CA) is given by equation (2). The change in unemployment
if EPAs were to fully algin their promotion expenditure with the levels of unemployment at
the sector level (u) is given by equation (3). In the results section we compute ΔU(B = CA)
and ΔU(B = u) for each country year to see how a change in the allocation of promotion
efforts would affect the aggregate level of unemployment without any need for increases in
EPAs’ budgets.
3 Data and Variable Construction
Aggregate unemployment rates are borrowed from ILO’s Key Indicators of the Labour Mar-
ket (KILM) indicators,3 which cover 96 countries over the period 1995-2009. The KILM
database provides the raw data reported by each country, and an adjusted series estimated
3https://www.ilo.org/ilostat.
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by the ILO. Because we use this data in a regression framework where we allow for measure-
ment error of the left-hand-side variable we prefer to use the raw data. Differences in values
between the two series are rather small and therefore when we estimate equation (1) using
the adjusted data results are qualitatively (and almost quantitatively) identical.4
Export data was obtained for the 2003-2014 is obtained from CEPII’s BACI dataset.5 The
data is available at the six digit of the Harmonized System that we then filter into the sector
disaggregation of the EPAs’ survey.
To estimate equation (1) using corr (Budget;CA) and corr (Budget; u) we face three data
challenges. The first one is to obtain data on the budget allocation of EPAs at the sector
level. We borrow detailed data collected by EPAs’ surveys conducted by the World Bank
and the International Trade Centre in three separate waves (2005, 2010, and 2014) and used
in Olarreaga, Sperlich and Trachsel (2020).6 All countries in our analysis participated in
at least two waves of these surveys and provide information on the operational budget of
their national EPA7 as well as their breakdown across 6 economic sectors. These sectors are
agriculture & agro-industry, machinery, electrical & electronic products, textiles & leather
products, other manufacturing, and services (IT, professional services, tourism, and other
services). Countries without information on the sectoral allocation of their EPA’s budget are
excluded from the analysis.8 The surveys contain information on the global EPAs’ budget in
between surveys, but the information on the allocation of the budget across different sectors
is only provided for the year of the survey. For the 4 and 5 year span between surveys, we
linearly project the budget shares in between two surveys. To check that this is not driving
4Results are available upon request.
5http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=1.
6The World Bank was responsible for the first two waves and more than 80 EPAs responded to each of
these surveys. The International Trade Centre conducted the third wave, although with a much narrower
scope of countries and mainly focused on European countries. Despite these differences, questionnaires
between different waves remain largely unchanged which allows us to construct some time-series.
7Note that export promotion agency (EPA) and trade promotion organization (TPO) are used inter-
changeably in these surveys. More recently, the institutions are also known as trade and investment promo-
tion organizations (TIPO).
8These countries are Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Canada, Indonesia, Japan, Netherlands, Oman, Papua New
Guinea, and Sweden.
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the results we will provide a robustness check in which only non-projected data is used.
The second data challenge is that we do not observe comparative advantage. However, several
options exists in the literature to estimate it. We adopt the theoretically well-grounded
Ricardian measure proposed by Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) using the gravity
framework. Using CEPII’s BACI trade data described above we estimate for every year
between 2003 and 2014 the following gravity equation (12 regressions are undertaken):
ln exportc,i,s = αc,s + αc,i + αi,s ∀ year=2003..2014 (4)
where exportc,i,s are exports country c to importer i of goods from sector s; αc,s are exporting
country*sector fixed effects that capture the comparative advantage of the exporting country
in sector s; αc,i are bilateral fixed effects that capture bilateral trade costs between the two
countries; and αi,s captures the comparative disadvantage of the importer i in sector s. As
shown by Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer (2012) one can then construct a theoretically
well-grounded measure of comparative advantage using the estimate of αc,s for each year:
CAc,s,t = exp(α̂c,s,t/σ). (5)
where σ is the elasticity of exports with respect to productivity, which is estimated at 6.53
by Costinot, Donaldson and Komunjer’s (2012).
The third data challenge is that sector level unemployment rates are not observed neither. To
estimate these unemployment rates at the sector level we followed the methodology developed
by Carrère et al. (2020). The idea is simple. We observe aggregate unemployment from the
ILO. We then assume that it can be decomposed into sector level component that is common
across countries and time, a country component, and a year component. The country and
year components can be easily estimated as they have the same disaggregate as aggregate
unemployment which varies by country and year. The sector level component cannot be
retried using sector fixed effects because aggregate unemployment does not vary by sector.
However, it can be decomposed into the weighted sum of sectoral unemployment, where the
8
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weights are given by the labor force in each sector. The labor force by sector is not observed
but sectoral employment is observed and using the unemployment rate at the sector level
(that we will estimate) is straightforward to see that the labor force looking for jobs in
each sector is given by the observed level of employment divided by 1 plus the sector level






c,s,t + γc + γt + εct (6)
where us is the sector-specific component of the sectoral unemployment rate that we es-
timate using equation (6); c,s,t is the employment share in sector s in country c at time
t; γc are country fixed effects that capture the country-specific component of the sectoral
unemployment rate; and γt are year fixed effects that capture the year-specific component
of the sectoral unemployment rate.
To estimate (6) we use employment data at the sector level from INDSTAT compiled by
UNIDO9 and match it to employment shares in each country for the seven sectors in EPAs’
surveys. The estimation is run on an unbalanced panel of 847 observations at the country-
year level resulting from the merging of ILO and UNIDO indicators for the largest possible
span. We use a non-linear estimator than imposes us to be positive, as well as our estimate
of sector level unemployment by country and year which given the additive form in equation
(6) is given by ûc,s,t = ûs + γ̂c + γ̂t.
3.1 EPAs’ strategic choices
We then measure for every country and year the correlation of EPA’s sectoral allocation
of their export promotion budgets with the estimated sector level unemployment rates and
comparative advantage. If the correlation between EPA’s budget and comparative advantage
is high this suggests that the EPA strategically focuses its promotion efforts in sectors in
which the country has a comparative advantage. Similarly, if the correlation between EPA’s
9See https://stat.unido.org/.
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budget and the estimated sector level unemployment rate is high, then the EPA strategically
focuses its promotion efforts in sectors where unemployment is more problematic. We also
compute the correlation between sector level unemployment and comparative advantage that
we use as a control variable as suggested by Carrère et al. (2020).
Summary statistics for all variables are provided in Table 1. The average correlation between
export promotion budgets and comparative advantage in our sample is 0.296. However there
is a lot of variation across countries and time and the correlation ranges between -0.997 and
0.975.10 The average correlation between export promotion budgets and sector level unem-
ployment is much lower at 0.066, but again there is a lot of heterogeneity, as it varies between
-0.733 and 0.543. However, given the large difference between these two average correlations,
one could argue that on average EPAs tend to focus their promotion efforts in sectors with
comparative advantage, rather than sectors in which there are high levels of unemployment.11
Figure 1 provides further evidence on how EPAs allocate their export promotion budgets.
The majority of agencies are not located in the lower left quadrant of Figure 1. This means
that few agencies focus on promoting sectors with little comparative advantage (negative
ρ(CA,B)) and low levels of unemployment (negative ρ(u,B)). Among the few agencies de-
tected in this quadrant, we find Italy, Austria, and Kosovo. There are however some agencies
that focus their efforts in sectors with high level of unemployment (positive ρ(u,B)), but
without much of a comparative advantage (negative ρ(CA,B)). In this right bottom quad-
rant, we find developed countries such as Spain, Lithuania, and Cyprus, as well as emerging
economies such as Brazil, and Mexico, Jordan, and Cambodia. On the top left quadrant, a
small set of countries focus on sectors with a large comparative advantage and low levels of
unemployment. This includes France, Turkey, Belgium, Czech Republic, Vietnam, Malaysia,
and Trinidad & Tobago. As illustrated by the histograms on the axis of Figure 1, most agen-
10We also compute a measure of this correlation using a two-year lagged measure of comparative advantage
as the impacts of export promotion on unemployment may be delayed.
11Note that on average there is a positive correlation between comparative advantage and sector level
unemployment rates. This could suggest that there could be a high correlation between the two other
correlations, which would be problematic in our econometric specification. As reported in Table 2 this is not
the case. The correlation between ρ(u,B) and ρ(CA,B) is only 0.073.
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cies focus their promotion efforts in sectors with comparative advantage, but with high levels
of unemployment. This is the case of most Middle Eastern and African agencies (in green).
European and Central Asian agencies (in blue) are more heterogeneous. These agencies also
represent the largest share of our sample (56 percent). Latin American agencies (in red) tend
to be in the right panels suggesting that they tend to focus on high unemployment sectors.
They represent 18 percent of the sample. Agencies in Asia and Oceania (in orange) tend to
be in the top panels suggesting that they tend to focus on sectors with high comparative
advantage. They represent 14 percent of the sample.
4 Results
Table 3 presents the results of the estimation of equation (1). In the first column we only
introduce the share of the export promotion in total exports on the right-hand-side without
controlling for the correlations between budget and unemployment, budget and comparative
advantage, and comparative advantage and unemployment. The second to fourth column
introduce one by one each of these correlation, and then finally the fifth column runs the
regression as in equation (1) with all correlations simultaneously.
Results in all columns suggest that increases in the share of export promotion on total ex-
ports leads to reductions in unemployment. The size of the impact is very small as a 1
percent increase in the share of the export promotion budgets seems to lead to a reduction
in unemployment somewhere between 0.05 and 0.07 percent. With average unemployment at
8 percent in the sample, this implies a reduction in unemployment of only 0.004 percentage
points. Thus increasing export promotion can on average help reduce unemployment, but
the impact is not very large.
Interestingly the allocation of export promotion budgets across sectors matters. A higher
correlation between export promotion budgets and comparative advantage leads to lower
levels of unemployment as shown in columns (2) and (5). On the other hand a higher cor-
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relation between export promotion budgets and sector level unemployment leads to higher
levels of unemployment, although this effect is not statistically significant.
Control variables suggest that countries with higher GDP per capita tend to have lower
levels of unemployment, perhaps capturing a better functioning of the labor market in these
countries. Similarly, countries with a larger population also tend to have lower levels of
unemployment. The correlation between comparative advantage and sector level unemploy-
ment has a positive impact on aggregate unemployment as shown by Carrère et al. (2020),
but the effect is not statistically significant.
We perform several robustness tests reported in Table 4. We first examine the geographic
robustness of the estimates. In column (1) we exclude Asian and Africa countries from the
sample. Together they represent 26 percent of the observations in our sample. In column (2)
we exclude Latin American countries, which represent 18 percent of the sample. In column
(3) we exclude European and Central Asian countries which together represent 56 percent
of the sample. In column (4) we run equation (1) using data only for European and Central
Asian countries. In column (5) we use observations for which we had data in the EPA sur-
vey for the allocation of export promotion budgets across sectors, and without estimating
the evolution of these shares in between surveys. Finally in column (6) we use a two-year
lagged measure of comparative advantage to capture potential delays on the impact of export
promotion budgets on the level of unemployment. The results in all columns are perfectly
consistent with the ones reported in Table 3. Increases in the share of export promotion
budgets will lead to small reductions in unemployment, and shifting the allocation of export
promotion budgets towards sectors with a comparative advantage leads to lower levels of
unemployment.
As discussed in section 2, these results could be biased due to endogeneity problems. Table 5
presents the instrumental variable estimates where the broadness of EPAs’ mandate is used
as an instrument for the share of export promotion budgets in total exports. Columns (1)
shows the results of the second stage, whereas column (2) shows the results of the first stage.
12
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Columns (3) and (4) provide the results of the second and first stage respectively, but when
the sample is restricted to those observations for which export promotion budgets were not
projected in between surveys. Results in column (1) suggest avlarge impact of increases on
the share of export promotion budgets on aggregate unemployment, but the size of the im-
pact is still quite modest. A 1 percent increase in the share leads to 0.322 percent reduction
in unemployment (or 0.03 percentage points at the sample mean). The impact is slightly
smaller in column (3) without the projected allocation of export promotion budgets across
sectors.
More interestingly both columns (1) and (3) suggest that increases in the correlation between
export promotion budgets and comparative advantage across sectors leads to decreases in
aggregate unemployment. Similarly, increases in the correlation between export promotion
budgets and sector level unemployment leads to increases in aggregate unemployment. Using
the estimates of column (1), and plugging them into equations (2) and (3) we can then com-
pute the change in unemployment that would occur if countries were to perfectly align their
allocation of export promotion budgets with their comparative advantage, or the sector level
unemployment observed in their country. The results are reported in Figure 2 where the hor-
izontal axis reports changes in unemployment following a full alignment of export promotion
budgets with comparative advantage, and the horizontal axis the change in unemployment
following a full alignment of export promotion budgets with sector level unemployment.
In most countries a full alignment with comparative advantage leads to a reduction in ag-
gregate unemployment. In only 23 percent of the observations there is an increase in unem-
ployment when EPAs fully align their strategy with the country’s comparative advantage.
The average decline in unemployment is 2.85 percent (or 0.23 percentage points). On the
other hand, a full alignment with sector level unemployment rates leads to an increase in
unemployment in almost all countries (97 percent of the observations). The average increase
of unemployment is equal to 6.22 percent (or 0.50 percentage points). These are much larger
effects that the change in aggregate unemployment following increases in export promotion
budgets. These results suggest that if unemployment were to be targeted by EPAs, their
13
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focus should be on sectors with comparative advantage, and that relatively large reductions
in unemployment can be reached without increases in EPAs’ budgets.
Interestingly if EPAs were to concentrate their export promotion efforts in sectors with low
unemployment (instead of high unemployment), the decline in aggregate unemployment is
very similar to the decline observed when EPAs align with the country’s comparative ad-
vantage. The correlation between the two changes is plotted in Figure 3. There is indeed an
almost perfect fit between an alignment in sectors with high comparative advantage and an
alignment in sectors with low unemployment. The correlation coefficient between the two
series is 0.999. This is not because of the fact that on average countries have a compara-
tive advantage in sectors with low unemployment. If anything our estimate suggest rather
the opposite, with an average correlation of 0.21 between comparative advantage and sector
level unemployment. The reason has to do with the fact that the coefficients in front of the
correlation between EPAs’ budget and comparative advantage, and between EPAs’ budget
and sector level unemployment estimated using equation (1) and reported in column (1) of
Table 5 are of similar size, but different sign.12
The policy implications of these simulations on EPAs’ strategic choices are quite clear. If
EPAs’ mandate were to change to target unemployment, this could be best achieved by EPAs
targeting sectors with comparative advantage. The reduction in aggregate unemployment
that will be reached will be similar to the one that would be obtained if EPAs were to tar-
get sectors with low unemployment. It is important to understand that this is not because
EPAs will allocate export promotion efforts in the same sectors under the two scenarios.
They would putting their efforts in different sectors, but the overall effect on aggregate un-
employment would be the same.
12Indeed, it is straightforward to see that in that the change in aggregate unemployment when aligning
with comparative advantage is given by: −0.423× [1− ρ (B;CA)] + 0.491× [ρ (u;CA)− ρ (B;u)] = 0.423×
ρ (B;CA)− 0.491× ρ (B;u) + 0.491× ρ (u;CA)− 0.423. And the change in aggregate unemployment when
aligning with low sectoral unemployment is given by: = 0.491×[–1–ρ (B;u)] –0.423×[–ρ (u;CA) –ρ (B;CA)] =
0.423 × ρ (B;CA) –0.491 × ρ (B;u) + 0.423 × ρ (u;CA) –0.491. Because of the two estimates being of very
similar size, but opposite sign the two changes in aggregate unemployment are almost identical.
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5 Concluding remarks
We examine the impact of export promotion on national unemployment. We consider three
different channels through which export promotion can affect unemployment. The first are
increases in the share of export promotion budgets in total exports. The second and third
channels capture potential changes in the allocation of export promotion budgets towards
sectors with a stronger comparative advantage or higher levels of unemployment.
We find that increases in EPA’s budget help reduce unemployment, but the size of the impact
is very small, suggesting that this is not necessarily the best tool to achieve large reductions
in unemployment. However, much larger declines in unemployment can be obtained if EPAs
change the strategic allocation of their export promotion efforts across sectors. A sizeable
reduction in unemployment can be achieved by focusing export promotion efforts in sectors
with a strong comparative advantage and away from sectors with high levels of unemploy-
ment.
This is an important result for policymakers as it suggests that important reductions in
unemployment can be achieved through export promotion without necessarily increasing ex-
port promotion budgets. In a world where most EPAs are mainly publicly funded, and where
governments face large and growing fiscal deficits, this could be an effective way for EPAs
to contribute not only to export growth, but also to reductions in unemployment, which is
arguable a more important policy goal.
Last, but not least, while focusing EPAs’ promotion efforts in sectors with comparative
advantage is clearly not a strategy that minimizes unemployment, our results show that
EPAs could not do better in terms of reductions in aggregate unemployment by focusing
their efforts in sectors with low unemployment. In other words, while export promotion
efforts would clearly focus on different sectors under the two, the reduction in aggregate
unemployment is almost identical. This is important as it suggests that focusing export
promotion efforts in sectors with a strong comparative advantage is a strategy that also
15
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minimizes aggregate unemployment.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Unemployment rates (percent) 7.956 4.67 0.622 33.761 294
EPA’s budget (000 USD) 68’181 100’558 166 606’738 294
EPA’s budget / Exports (percent) 0.13 0.22 0.001 1.502 292
GDP per capita (USD) 21’779 18’850 458 97’008 294
Population (in thousands) 25’412 37’141 318 196’796 294
Correlation (CA, Budget) 0.296 0.463 -0.997 0.975 294
Correlation (lagged CA, Budget) 0.289 0.467 -0.999 0.994 294
Correlation (Unemployment, Budget) 0.066 0.297 -0.733 0.543 294
Correlation (CA, Unemployment) 0.209 0.246 -0.443 0.775 294
Data source: ILO’s KILM, World Bank’s WDI, and CEPII’s BACI.
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Table 2: Cross-correlation table
Variables ρ(CA,B) ρ(u,B) ρ(CA, u) ρ(CAt−2, B)
Correlation (CA, Budget) ρ(CA,B) 1.000
Correlation (Unemployment, Budget) ρ(u,B) 0.073 1.000
Correlation (CA, Unemployment) ρ(CA, u) 0.292 0.246 1.000
Correlation (lagged CA, Budget) ρ(CAt−2, B) 0.986 0.069 0.272 1.000
20
Cristian Ugarte and Marcelo Olarreaga
Table 3: Regressions of unemployment rates
Unemployment rates (in logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln EPA’s Budget/Exports -0.045∗ -0.058∗∗ -0.053∗∗ -0.047∗ -0.071∗∗∗





ρ(CA, u) 0.273 0.274
(0.221) (0.215)
ln GDP per capita -1.011∗∗∗ -0.989∗∗∗ -1.021∗∗∗ -1.036∗∗∗ -1.025∗∗∗
(0.132) (0.128) (0.133) (0.134) (0.130)
ln population -1.422∗∗ -1.231∗ -1.291∗ -1.439∗∗ -1.095∗
(0.650) (0.631) (0.661) (0.649) (0.641)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 292 292 292 292 292
R2 0.409 0.448 0.412 0.413 0.456
Adjusted R2 0.249 0.296 0.250 0.251 0.299
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4: Robustness checks
Unemployment rates (in logs)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
excluding excluding excluding only selected lagged
As. + Af. L. Am. Europe Europe years CA
ln EPA’s Budget/Exports -0.072∗∗ -0.051∗ -0.163∗∗∗ -0.047 -0.097 -0.071∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.049) (0.032) (0.064) (0.027)
ρ(CA,Budget) -0.383∗∗∗ -0.295∗∗∗ -0.171∗ -0.350∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗ -0.266∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.089) (0.097) (0.111) (0.156) (0.077)
ρ(u,Budget) 0.135 0.123 -0.017 0.077 0.223 0.155
(0.142) (0.126) (0.153) (0.157) (0.233) (0.118)
ρ(CA, u) 0.349 0.211 0.026 0.298 0.215 0.315
(0.251) (0.240) (0.251) (0.287) (0.539) (0.217)
ln GDP per capita -1.127∗∗∗ -1.106∗∗∗ -0.529∗∗∗ -1.420∗∗∗ -0.901∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗∗
(0.162) (0.165) (0.131) (0.275) (0.270) (0.131)
ln population -1.673∗ -1.287∗ 1.503∗ -2.542∗∗ -0.964 -1.170∗
(0.852) (0.693) (0.860) (1.124) (1.340) (0.645)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 229 239 116 176 90 292
R2 0.484 0.472 0.513 0.513 0.387 0.446
Adjusted R2 0.336 0.317 0.300 0.369 -0.705 0.287
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5: Instrumental variable regressions of unemployment rates
Whole sample Selected years
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2nd 1st 2nd 1st
ln EPA’s Budget/Exports -0.322*** -0.249*
(0.119) (0.149)
ρ(CA,Budget) -0.423*** -0.399** -0.385*** -0.525
(0.096) (0.196) (0.109) (0.437)
ρ(u,Budget) 0.491** 1.311*** 0.410* 1.241**
(0.199) (0.274) (0.233) (0.581)
ρ(CA, u) 0.495** 0.815 0.315 0.322
(0.246) (0.524) (0.360) (1.434)
ln GDP per capita -1.043*** -0.065 -0.921*** 0.043
(0.135) (0.318) (0.176) (0.723)
ln population -1.713** -4.237** -1.468 -5.183
(0.725) (1.639) (0.988) (3.676)
EPA’s responsibility/mandate broadness 0.234*** 0.265
(0.066) (0.162)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 292 292 90 90
R-squared 0.858 0.922 0.921 0.920
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 1: Strategies for EPA budget allocation: comparative advantage vs unemployment
Note: ρ(CA; Budget) is the correlation between sectoral comparative advantage and EPA’s budget shares
and ρ(u; Budget) is the one between sectoral unemployment rates and EPA’s budget shares. European and
Central Asian countries are colored in blue, Latin American countries in red, Middle Eastern and African
countries in green, and countries in Asia and Oceania in orange.
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Figure 2: Changes in aggregate unemployment when EPAs adopt extreme strategies: High
CA vs High unemployment
Note: European and Central Asian countries are colored in blue, Latin American countries in red, Middle
Eastern and African countries in green, and countries in Asia and Oceania in orange.
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Figure 3: Changes in unemployment when EPAs adopt extreme strategies: High CA vs Low
unemployment
Note: European and Central Asian countries are colored in blue, Latin American countries in red, Middle
Eastern and African countries in green, and countries in Asia and Oceania in orange.
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